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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we promote the idea that recent woes in hardware
security are not because of a lack of technical solutions but rather
because market forces and incentives prevent those with the ability
to fix problems from doing so. At the root of the problem is the fact
that hardware security comes at a cost; Present issues in hardware
security can be seen as the result of the players in the game of
hardware security finding ways of avoiding paying this cost. We
formulate this idea into a doctrine of security, namely the Doctrine
of Shared Burdens. Three cases studies—Rowhammer, Spectre, and
Meltdown—are interpreted though the lens of this doctrine. Our
doctrine illuminates why these problems and exist and what can
be done about them.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Once niche and arcane, the field of hardware security has recently
become one of the most pressing issues in cybersecurity. Physical-
level attacks like Rowhammer gave attackers the ability to modify
a system’s memory at will [1]. And microarchitectural side chan-
nel attacks like Spectre and Meltdown have shown how pervasive,
dangerous, and hard-to-fix a hardware attack could be [2, 3]. Es-
pecially concerning is that these problems, while well-known and
publicized, have generally not been fixed. Why?
The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is not a lack of technical so-
lutions. Instead, we find that hardware security problems persist
because suffers from a series of market failures such as information
asymmetry, prisoners dilemmas, and markets for lemons, which
disincentivize those who are able to fix serious security vulnerabil-
ities from doing so (see Appendix A for more on market failures
in hardware security). Underpinning these market failures is the
fact that hardware security usually comes at a cost in terms of
performance, power, or area. We propose the notion that the poor
state of hardware security is due to the various agents in the game
of hardware security trying to avoid paying this cost.
We crystallize this notion into a conceptual framework called
the Doctrine of Shared Burdens, which we present in Section 2.
Our doctrine also illustrates why prior doctrines of security do
not apply to the domain of hardware security in Section 3. We
then use the Doctrine of Shared Burdens to illuminate some of the
most serious problems in hardware security in recent years, namely
Rowhammer, Spectre, and Meltdown. We find that our Doctrine
of Shared Burdens incisively reveals the true issues behind these
troublesome vulnerabilities and explains why have persisted or
why they arose in the first place. Section 3 also uses our doctrine
to shed light on how researchers, engineers, and policymakers can
work to fix them. Finally, this paper concludes in Section 4.
2 DOCTRINE OF SHARED BURDENS
We propose a doctrine of hardware security based on the premise
that hardware security is a burden that comes with a cost. This cost
is necessarily borne by at least one of the four players in the game
of hardware security, namely the Vendors, Users, Authorities, and
Attackers.
2.0.1 The Vendors. The Vendors are the agents who design and
and build systems for profit. In our doctrine, the Vendors must bear
the burden of ensuring that their products are safe and not easily
exploitable. The Vendors pay their burden to security through the
cost of validating their products against vulnerabilities, as well as
through the opportunity cost of not making products that are more
competitive in the marketplace but less secure.
2.0.2 The Users. The Users are the victims of attack. The scope
of who can be considered a “User” can range significantly, from a
smartphone user to the cybersecurity team at a large organization.
In our doctrine, it is the responsibility of the Users to secure their
systems as best as possible. Importantly, this means that a User is
responsible for the protection of the assets they are entrusted with.
The Users pay for security by incurring the always-on cost of
defending their systems. The Users must also uphold their responsi-
bility to security by applying patches and by not disabling security
features, or else the Users will end up free riding off of the security
efforts of others.
2.0.3 The Authorities. The Authorities are the regulatory bodies
that have a degree of authority over the Vendors and the Users. The
Authorities have the unique ability to correct the failures in the mar-
ketplace for security. The role of the Authorities is often assumed
by governments, but not always. For example, self-regulatory orga-
nizations (SROs) are non-governmental regulatory groups which
have a degree of regulatory authority over certain industries 1 ;
SROs and other non-governmental agents can assume the role of
an Authority as well. An Authority has the burden of regulating,
mandating, and sometimes enforcing the Vendors and the Users to
uphold their respective responsibilities to security. This can come
in the form of mandates or regulations, e.g. a mandate that Vendors
use two-factor authentication in their products. An Authority also
has the responsibility of punishing and prosecuting the Attackers
when possible.
1A well-known and exemplar SRO is the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
Inc. (FINRA) which regulates and arbitrates all stock market operations in the United
States. FINRA is a non-governmental organization comprised of the very members it
regulates. FINRA is authorized by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission to
enforce the rules and regulations of the the securities industry.
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Figure 1: The four players in the game of hardware secu-
rity, and the relationships between them. The Doctrine
of Shared Burdens says that systems should be designed
so that the burden of security is distributed between
these four players.
Doctrine of Prevention
Doctrine of Security 
as a Public Good
Doctrine of Risk
Management
Doctrine of Deterrence
Doctrine of Shared
Burdens
Vendors Users Authorities Attackers
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Table 1: Prior doctrines focus on assigning the burden
of security to a single party. Our new proposed doctrine
of shared burdens argues that security must be seen as
a burden to shared among all the players in the game of
security.
2.0.4 The Attackers. Finally, the fourth player in the security game
of our shared-burden doctrine is the Attacker. The Attacker is the
party who perpetrates cybercrime. Our doctrine posits that we
should make attacks as expensive as possible for the Attackers in
an attempt to discourage them from attacking systems in the first
place.
We view the “cost” an Attacker pays as the opportunity cost they
incur by choosing to attack a system, as well as the consequences
they may face as a result of this decision. We can consider the op-
portunity cost to be the amount of effort or resources an Attacker
may need to expend to be successful. Our doctrine dictates that we
should build defenses that require a high cost for the Attacker to
overcome. Importantly, our doctrine also says that we should do so
without overburdening the User, who must pay for the always-on
cost of defense. In other words, our defenses should be deliberately
asymmetric against the Attackers and should offload the “cost” of
security from the Users to the Attackers as much as possible. One
such example is cryptography, which imposes a minor overhead
cost to Users with the proper keys, but an enormous cost for an
Attacker to break if they don’t possess the necessary keys. Finally,
we view the risk an Attacker assumes when breaking the law as
another form of “cost” the Attacker pays. Our doctrine says that
we should make Attackers pay for their actions by improving the
Authorities’ ability to catch and prosecute the Attackers and in-
creasing the risks and punishments of attacking. Both of these costs
paid by the Attackers are intended to discourage and deter attacks.
3 DIFFERENCES FROM PRIOR DOCTRINES
We find that existing doctrines of cybersecurity doctrines are in-
sufficient because they misplace the burden of security among the
players in the security game or do not apply to the domain of hard-
ware security. We examine four doctrines of security promulgated
by Mulligan and Schneider [4].
3.1 Doctrine of Prevention
The Doctrine of Prevention states that security should be achieved
by eliminating bugs and vulnerabilities from systems. While a
worthwhile goal, Mulligan and Schneider point out that such a doc-
trine is impractical to achieve. First, even a vulnerability-free system
can still be overcome by social engineering or insider malfeasance.
Second, even if we ignore the human element, the computational
cost of proving a design to be free of vulnerabilities is often imprac-
tical [4]. Mulligan and Schneider position this in terms of software
security but the arguments largely hold for hardware security as
well, which is why most hardware designs are not formally veri-
fied. However, even a formally verified design does not guarantee
a secure product, as formal proofs rest on assumptions about how
a design will be used and the environment under which it will be
operated, and are only valid if these assumptions are met.
We add that the Doctrine of Prevention also fails because it
assumes that the Vendors are sufficiently motivated to build secure
products in the first place. Failures in the marketplace for hardware
security show that this is not always the case. The Doctrine of
Shared Burdens clarifies that an Authority is needed to regulate
and sometimes coerce the Vendors into creating secure products.
3.2 Doctrine of Risk Management
The Doctrine of RiskManagement takes a more pragmatic approach
to security by acknowledging that vulnerabilities and attacks are
inevitable. Rather than trying to build perfectly secure systems, the
Doctrine of Risk Management puts security into terms of probabili-
ties and expectations. According to this doctrine, security adminis-
trators should prioritize finding and fixing the vulnerabilities that
are 1) most likely to be exploited, and 2) most likely to cause harm
if exploited. This doctrine posits that security ought to be seen as
an investment against future attacks and financial losses, and that
the “right” level of security is whatever is best for an organization’s
bottom line.
This doctrine fails because there is a lack of accurate and pub-
licly available information on threats and attacks, making it very
difficult to quantitatively reason about the risks of cyber attack
and build useful actuarial models. The consequence is that security
practitioners are rarely able to make metric-driven decisions on
how to best secure their systems, and instead must resort to an ad
hoc and qualitative approach to this doctrine.
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The Doctrine of RiskManagement also falls short in its allocation
of the burden of security. The doctrine requires the Users to assume
the full cost of security. Market failures and inefficiencies promise
that this strategy will always be suboptimal, as Users are subject
to free riding and typically don’t know enough about security
to prevent markets for lemons. The doctrine underburdens the
Vendors, who are free to sell products known to be insecure, and it
underburdens the Attackers, who face no repercussions for their
actions.
3.3 Doctrine of Deterrence
The third doctrine of cybersecurity that Mulligan and Schneider
highlight aims to discourage crime by improving authorities’ ability
to catch and prosecute the Attackers. This doctrine is hard enough
to achieve in software and network security—cybercrime forensics
are limited in their ability to assign blame, mostly because our cur-
rent internet infrastructure is poorly equipped to handle attribution.
This can be partially offset with robust logging, but prosecution
remains difficult as it often crosses international borders.
The problem becomes even more challenging in the domain of
hardware security. Recent microarchitectural attacks such as Spec-
tre [2] and Meltdown [3] demonstrated exploits that are essentially
silent to the User. How can a User catch a cybercriminal red-handed
if the User has no way of telling that they are being attacked in the
first place? The lack of threat of prosecution means that there is
little to deter the Attackers.
Even if better attribution were possible, this doctrine fails be-
cause it aims to put the entire cost of security onto the Attacker,
and ignores the responsibilities the Authorities, Vendors, and Users
must play in achieving security. Rather than leaving the security
holes open and prosecuting the Attackers later, it would be more
efficient for an Authority to hold the Vendors more accountable
and require them to close the security holes in the first place.
3.4 Doctrine of Cybersecurity as a Public Good
Mulligan and Schneider propose viewing security as a public good
using another well-studied public good—public health—as an exem-
plar. According to Mulligan and Schneider, it is the responsibility
of an Authority (namely the government) to ensure and administer
public health, through activities such as public education, disease
prevention, and disease control. Public health is a mature model
of how and where an Authority’s obligation to protect the popula-
tion can supersede individual liberties. Using this as a framework,
Mulligan and Schneider define the goals of the public goods cy-
bersecurity doctrine as (i) providing public cybersecurity, and (ii)
managing insecurity in a way that balances individual rights and
public welfare.
This doctrine improperly assigns the burden of security to the
Authorities alone. As a result, applying the public health model to
cybersecurity may require a level of Authority coercion far beyond
what the society is currently willing to accept [5]. For example,
we see little precedent for something like a government-enforced
cyber-quarantine or cyber-vaccinations, and have little reason to
believe a government can (or should) take on the full responsibility
of security.
We add that the sheer complexity of hardware is also a severe
hindrance to effective Authority-administered security. Only the
Vendors and industry experts know how best to secure their prod-
ucts; Authority intervention would inevitably be heavy-handed
and misguided. Allowing the Vendors to secure their own devices,
but holding them liable for their products’ security would be more
efficient. The role of the Authorities should be to regulate indus-
tries and correct market failures, but not to administer security
wholesale.
This doctrine also falls short in its framing of the problem, as
it fails to hold the Attackers responsible. The doctrine lacks the
notions of punishment and deterrence. A full-picture view of secu-
rity needs to consider the Attacker as an active participant in the
struggle for security, and particularly as a self-interested participant
who is motivated by the rewards of hacking but deterred by its
drawbacks, such as the real or perceived risk of being caught and
punished.
4 CASE STUDIES
Weexamine three recent high-profile problems in hardware security—
Rowhammer, Spectre, and Meltdown—as case studies that illustrate
how our doctrine can inform us on how we should allocate the
burden of security.
4.1 Rowhammer
Rowhammer is a problem found in modern Dynamic Random Ac-
cess Memory (DRAM), the technology behind main memory in
virtually all computing devices. We use it as a case study because
it exemplifies an end-to-end application of our Doctrine of Shared
Burdens, from initial discovery to what we believe to be its solution.
It provides an excellent model of how the burden of defense can be
distributed between Vendors, Users, Authorities, and Attackers.
4.1.1 The Attack. DRAM is a victim of its own success. For the
last forty years, its transistors have shrank tremendously, allowing
for an exponential increase in density (bits stored per unit area).
Rowhammer is an unintended consequence of this tremendous
density.
As DRAM cells (essentially just a transistor and a capacitor, ca-
pable of storing a single bit) got smaller and smaller, two things
happened. First, they became more delicate and more susceptible
to losing the data they stored. And second, as DRAM components
became more tightly packed together, they started electromagneti-
cally interfering with each other. In 2014, it was shown that this
interference could be reliably harnessed to alter the contents of
the data stored in DRAM by repeatedly accessing the same row of
DRAM memory (henceforth known as “hammering”), wherein the
fluctuations in voltage on the DRAM’s internal wires could flip the
values of the bits stored in nearby DRAM cells [1]. And in 2015,
this primitive was demonstrated to enable a working exploit [6].
Rowhammer is a serious hardware vulnerability because it breaks
basic integrity guarantees in computer systems by allowing Attack-
ers to modify unauthorized memory locations, enabling an entire
new class of attacks. Rowhammer has demonstrated dangerous
potential, and can be leveraged to achieve privilege escalation [6],
cross-VM attacks [7], and even as a side channel to read privileged
data [8]. To make matters worse, there’s no easy fix—bits can flip
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faster than a doubled DRAM refresh rate can fix, and are more
numerous than error correcting codes (ECC) can correct [1].
4.1.2 Who Should Fix Rowhammer? How the DRAM industry has
handled the rowhammer problem is an interesting and illuminating
case study in how overall security is often a function of the distribu-
tion of burdens between the Vendors, the Users, the Authorities, and
the Attackers. We begin by looking at the balance of burdens im-
mediately after the rowhammer problem was identified. Since ECC
couldn’t fix the problem, the only available rowhammer defense a
User could employ was to increase the DRAM refresh rate2, thus
reducing how long a DRAM row could be “hammered” before being
automatically refreshed. Unfortunately, simply doubling the refresh
rate doesn’t fix the problem—the authors estimate that, in the worst
case, the refresh rate would need to increase by a factor of seven in
order to fully mitigate bit flips [1]. Since refresh is already such a
expensive operation (in terms of both DRAM latency and energy),
the overhead of such a defense would come at a tremendous cost.
By increasing the refresh rate, it is ultimately the Users who pay
for security, who suffer from slower memory that consumes more
energy. Through the perspective of our doctrine of shared burdens,
we see that the cost of security is placed solely on the Users, and
that the other players are not shouldering their fair share of the
burden.
Rowhammer is a flaw in DRAM products, and should be the
responsibility of the Vendors to correct. However, it is not imme-
diately clear which Vendor should be responsible for fixing the
problem: For DRAM to be used, it requires an external memory
controller—typically located on the same chip as the CPU—to issue
commands such as reads, writes, and refreshes. And of the vari-
ous rowhammer defenses promoted after the vulnerability became
known, some advocated for rowhammer to be fixed by the memory
controller whiles others advocated that the problem should be fixed
within the DRAM chips themselves. Since the DRAM chips and
memory controllers are made by different companies, who should
be responsible for fixing the problem?
If the memory controllers vendors and DRAM vendors operated
completely unconstrained, it is reasonable to believe that neither
side would voluntarily take on the burden of fixing rowhammer.
Each side could rightfully claim that it is the responsibility of the
other side to fix the problem. However, the memory controller ven-
dors and the DRAM vendors do not operate wholly unconstrained.
Both sides belong to JEDEC, a DRAM industry trade organiza-
tion. JEDEC decides and defines standards for DRAM technologies,
including the interface between DRAM devices and memory con-
trollers, which the JEDEC members must then follow. Importantly,
JEDEC members don’t join because they like being told how their
products should behave; Rather, JEDEC members join because it is
in their own self interest to do so: Standardization increases cross-
compatibility between DRAM and the devices that use it, effectively
opening up a DRAM vendor’s products to a wider consumer base.
For a DRAM vendor not to comply with JEDEC standardization
would essentially be a death sentence, as no memory controller
vendor would want their product to be reliant on a single DRAM
vendor. We see then that JEDEC has a high degree of authority over
2DRAM is dynamic, meaning that the DRAM cells will lose their contents unless they
are periodically refreshed.
the DRAM industry, and can act in the role of an Authority in our
doctrine of shared burdens.
Takeaway #1: Trade organizations and standards commit-
tees can fulfill the role of an Authority.
But JEDEC is a non-governmental organization, and is not guar-
anteed to make decisions that are in the best interest of widespread
security. After all, JEDEC is comprised of self-interested compa-
nies; If these companies collectively decided against a standardized
rowhammer defense, it is plausible that rowhammer would remain
unsolved. Indeed, if JEDEC was comprised solely of DRAM and
memory controller vendors, this might be the case. But in addition
to DRAM and memory controller vendors, JEDEC also contains
a significant number of DRAM consumers, in industries ranging
from cloud computing and automotive to aerospace and defense.
Since these consumers, who play the role of the User rather than
the Vendor, stand to lose more in case of DRAM insecurity than
the Vendors, it is likely that their presence in JEDEC has influenced
the standardization committees towards seriously addressing the
rowhammer problem.
Takeaway #2: Consumer (User) interest groups may be
needed to motivate an Authority into acting on their behalf.
4.1.3 Attempt # 1: TRR. One of the first concerted efforts to ad-
dress rowhammer problem was Targeted Row Refresh (TRR), an
optional mode of operation defined in JEDEC’s 2014 LPDDR4 stan-
dard (the fourth generation of low-power DRAM) [9]. And while
not part of the DDR4 (fourth generation DRAM, intended for higher-
performance applications than LPDDR4) standard, some DRAM
vendors opted to include TRR in some of their later DDR4 products
as well. TRR wasn’t a prescriptive order telling DRAM vendors how
to fix rowhammer, but was more of a contract between memory
controller and DRAM device on the high-level actions that should
be taken in the presence of excessive row activations. Patents give
hints on how each vendor may have internally implemented TRR
[10–13], but ultimately the architecture used commercial devices is
largely unknown. While TRR was a first step towards rowhammer
protection, it unfortunately was doomed to fail—it could only re-
fresh a limited number of DRAM rows per DRAM refresh window,
and was only designed to refresh the rows physically adjacent to ex-
cessively activated (i.e. hammered) rows. This allowed rowhammer
attacks with multiple targets to overwhelm TRR’s ability to fix the
hotspots, and did not address the issue of rowhammers affecting
more than just the nearest physically adjacent row [14]. Given that
the LPDDR4 standard was released only a few months after the
rowhammer bug was announced, it is not surprising and perhaps
even expected that the DRAM industry’s first attempt at fixing the
rowhammer problem was not without flaw.
Despite its shortcomings, one of the DDR4 vendors (Vendor C
in the TRRespass paper) seems to have leveraged TRR successfully
enough to completely protect against many variants of rowhammer
[14]. However, because vendors A and B also implement TRR yet
still fall susceptible to rowhammer, wemust conclude that the differ-
ence between success and failure is not the protocol defined in the
standard itself, but the private, proprietary, and vendor-dependent
architecture used to implement TRR. In short, the LPDDR4 stan-
dard alone does not offer sufficient protection against rowhammer.
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JEDECwas presumably aware of this, which is why they introduced
a new rowhammer defense in the next generation of DRAM.
4.1.4 Attempt # 2: RFM. In early 2020, JEDEC released the LPDDR5
standard. In LPDDR5, JEDEC replaced TRR with Refresh Manage-
ment (RFM) [15]. In RFM, the DRAM device counts activate com-
mands per bank, and issues a refresh once a threshold number of
activations has been reached. RFM requires a degree of coordination
between the memory controller and DRAM device, and distributes
the burden of defense between the DRAM vendors and the memory
controller vendors. While LPDDR5 devices are just now entering
the market and researchers have not yet been able to experimentally
evaluate RFM, the tightness of the standard suggests that RFM will
provide a very high level of protection against rowhammer attacks,
possibly even eliminating the rowhammer problem altogether. And
while the DDR5 standard hasn’t yet been released, we suspect that
it will include a very similar if not identical rowhammer defense.
RFM is an asymmetrical defense that punishes the Attacker but
not the User. In the LPDDR5 standard, RFM is defined to have the
memory controller count the number of times a row of DRAM
memory is accessed via an ACT (activate) command. If the number
of activations exceeds some threshold, the memory controller issues
a special type of refresh command (RFM) which applies fine-grained,
selective refreshes to “hot” regions in the DRAM (essentially regions
of DRAM cells that have repeatedly been accessed since the last
time the region was refreshed). The DRAM chips are specially
designed to account for this special type of refresh and still maintain
performance. Therefore, if an Attacker tries to rowhammer a region
of DRAM by repeatedly activating rows in some region of DRAM,
RFM will automatically refresh the victim region, nullifying any
advances the Attacker had made. The standard is flexible enough
to allow the DRAM and memory controller vendors to “tune” the
defense so that the RFM mechanisms spring into action before an
Attacker is able to make any headway in flipping DRAM bits. Yet at
the same time, the RFM standard is designed not to burden the User
(the DRAM owner and user) with excessive, additional refreshes,
minimizing the always-on cost of rowhammer defense. Then if RFM
is properly implemented, we expect that it will successfully shift
the burden of security away from the User and onto the Attacker.
RFM only burdens systems with its full weight in the presence of
anomalous behavior.
Takeaway #3: The burden of security can be offloaded from
the User to the Attacker by punishing anomalous behavior.
TheDRAM industry’s response to the rowhammer problem, from
its initial discovery to what seems to be a viable solution (RFM),
shows how the burden of security can be allocated among the four
players of the security game. This case study also provides exam-
ples of how the thorny non-technical challenges can be overcome,
namely how responsibility over a community-wide problem can be
allocated and distributed in a self-regulatory body such as JEDEC.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that JEDEC, a non-governmental
organization with no coercive power, was able to get its members to
agree to collectively take on the burden of securing their products
against rowhammer. We see that standards can play a huge role
in achieving security by getting Vendors to agree to take on some
of the cost of security. Perhaps other community-wide security
problems can be solved if we leverage standardization to make it in
the best interest of those who have the ability to fix longstanding
problems to do so.
4.2 Spectre
Another serious open threat to hardware security is Spectre [2].
Announced in early 2018, Spectre demonstrated that speculative
execution, a performance-enhancing feature in modern proces-
sors, could be exploited in a dangerous new type of attack. Unlike
Rowhammer, Spectre is still very much an open problem that has
little in the way of usable and deployable solutions.
4.2.1 The Attack. Spectre targets speculative execution. Specula-
tive execution in processors can be defined as any action that is
taken preemptively and on the expectation (but not guarantee) that
a program’s execution will follow one path and not some other
path. Modern processors employ many types of speculation as an
effective means of improving performance. In the canonical Spec-
tre attack, the type of speculation targeted was branch prediction,
which works as follows: When a processor is executing a program,
it frequently encounters branches in the execution path. Branches
can come in many forms. They can be conditional, where a particu-
lar execution path is taken if some set of conditions are met and
not taken if the conditions are not met (an if statement is a simple
example of this). Branches can also be indirect. Unlike conditional
branches, which explicitly tell the CPU the address at which to
start executing if the condition holds, an indirect branch instead
tells the CPU where the address is located. As it turns out, both
types of branches are highly predictable using on-line machine
learning algorithms built into the hardware. CPUs can achieve
dramatic performance improvements if they can correctly predict
branch direction, because they can start speculatively executing the
branch before the program’s actual branch direction is known. If
the branch prediction was correct, then the speculatively executed
instructions are confirmed to be correct, and the program is further
along in its execution than if the CPU has waited until the direction
of the branch was known. But if the branch prediction was wrong,
the speculatively executed instructions are incorrect, and must be
purged from the CPU.
It is in this way that Spectre takes advantage of speculative
execution. Spectre maliciously mistrains the branch predictor to
purposely mispeculate and access out-of-bounds data. Before Spec-
tre, such mispeculation wasn’t thought to be a security problem,
because the CPU invalidates speculated instructions once it realizes
it mispredicted. But Spectre showed that the results of mispecu-
lated, out-of-bounds instructions could be exfiltrated even when
invalidated. Spectre exfiltrates data through cache timing side chan-
nels such as Flush+Reload [16, 17] or Evict+Reload [18], although
other microarchitectural side channels could theoretically be used
as well. While originally demonstrated to attack branch prediction,
Spectre attacks can target many of the types of speculation found
in modern CPUs.
Spectre is a serious threat to security at large. It has the potential
to read arbitrary memory locations, including cryptographic keys.
But perhaps the most troubling to security researchers is that there
is no real solution to the problem. Computer architects have not
yet found a way to engineer themselves out of the problem, and
there is no widely accepted solution.
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4.2.2 Who Should Fix Spectre? The only fail-safe defense currently
available is to turn off speculation altogether. This is comparable
to the early days of the rowhammer vulnerability, where the only
available solution was to raise the refresh rate to intolerable levels.
Much like the rowhammer problem was several years ago, the
burden of defense against Spectre rests far too heavily on the Users
of systems, and not nearly enough on the Vendors, Authorities, or
Attackers. Spectre defenses will require a rebalancing of these roles
and responsibilities before a solution can be achieved.
As with rowhammer, we can first look to the Vendors to take
upon more of the burden of security. Unlike rowhammer, which had
multiple parties partially to blame, with Spectre we know exactly
who needs to fix the problem: the CPU vendors. Unfortunately,
there is no JEDEC-like organization among CPU vendors to stan-
dardize what a defense should look like. In the terms of our doctrine
of shared burdens, there is no Authority that can exert its authority
and get the CPU vendors to build Spectre defenses into their prod-
ucts. Likewise, there are no consumer advocate groups that have
enough influence to motivate the CPU vendors to fix the problem
either. Finally, information asymmetry prevents the market from
correcting the problem: Due to the sheer complexity of CPUs, con-
sumers won’t be able to evaluate and properly price the value of a
Spectre defense, and won’t pay a premium for a feature (Spectre
security) they can’t identify, causing a market for lemons. This puts
the CPU vendors in a prisoner’s dilemma. It would be beneficial
for all if the vendors cooperate and agree to jointly fix Spectre in
their products, but the threat of defection from competing Vendors
makes this an irrational proposition. In other words, it is rational
for the CPU Vendors to not fix Spectre, at the expense of security as
a whole. Unconstrained and financially unmotivated, we shouldn’t
expect the CPU vendors to take upon the burden of fixing Spectre
without first applying some kind of exogenous pressure.
Takeaway #4: Spectre stands to remain unresolved, because
the CPU vendors are stuck in a prisoner’s dilemma and there
is no Authority to correct this market failure.
Even if a JEDEC-like organization did exist for CPU vendors
and was able to coordinate a standardized defense, what would
such a defense look like? The defense would have to be specific
enough to fix the problem but general enough to allow for variations
in implementations between the different Vendors. One way we
can foresee such an approach would be a tax on performance or
energy. This approach balances the burden between Vendors and
Users, with the Vendors paying to implement the defense and the
Users paying (in terms of performance or energy) for the always-on
overhead.
In our search for a solution to Spectre, we must also consider the
balance of the burden of security between the Attacker and User.
For defenses to be accepted by the Users, we need the always-on, re-
curring cost of defense to be tolerably low. Likewise, in accordance
with our doctrine of distributed burdens, we want the burden of
defense to be asymmetrically placed onto the Attackers. We would
like defenses that can flare up when anomalous behavior is detected.
We can consider mispeculation to be the anomalous behavior. How-
ever, since mispeculation is a regular occurrence even in benign
program execution, we need a defense that doesn’t needlessly pun-
ish programs for mispeculating.We can look to the adaptive lockout
mechanisms on phones and laptops as an example: Perhaps the
“punishment” meted out by a Spectre defense should scale with the
number of mispeculations within some time frame, where punish-
ment could be something like the speed at which a CPU allows a
process to execute.
4.3 Meltdown
Meltdown is a hardware-based attack that was announced at the
same time as Spectre [3]. Meltdown shares some similarities with
Spectre, and uses some of the same mechanisms as the Spectre at-
tack, and therefore is sometimes conflated with Spectre or thought
to be a rooted in the same underlying problem. However, while
superficially similar, Spectre and Meltdown are fundamentally dif-
ferent problems and must be thought of as such. Seeing Meltdown
through the lens of our doctrine requires its own interpretation,
independent of Spectre. From this case study we see an example
of where market forces can incentivize a Vendor to fix some types
of hardware security problems without the need for an Authority,
and examine the circumstances that make this possible.
4.3.1 The Attack. Meltdown is a consequence of an optimization
found in many processors. The optimization (and its deleterious
effects) stem from the way that some processors handle faults. A
fault is an exception raised by the hardware when code tries to
do something unallowed or undefined, such as a division by zero,
or in the case of Meltdown, an attempt to read privileged kernel
data from an unprivileged process. When such a fault occurs, the
processor will typically halt or kill the offending process. Prior to
Meltdown, the way many processors handled faults would best
be described as “lazy”, meaning that the they wouldn’t deal with
the faults for as long as possible. More specifically, vulnerable pro-
cessors wouldn’t kill such an unauthorized memory access until
just before the faulting instruction retires and updates the architec-
tural state of the program. Presumably, some CPU vendors chose
to build their fault handling this way because it enabled some kind
of optimization somewhere else in the processor. At first glance,
this seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to do—eventually the
fault is caught, and before the faulty access is able to update the
program, so where’s the harm? The problem is that between the
illegal memory access and the exception being raised, for a brief
period of time the unauthorized memory access resides somewhere
in the processor’s microarchitectural state. Meltdown is a way of
exfiltrating this secret memory value in the small time window
between unauthorized access and fault handling.
Meltdown leverages a performance-enhancing technique known
as out-of-order execution to exfiltrate the secret value. Out-of-order
execution is a performance-enhancing technique used in proces-
sors wherein instructions are allowed to execute as soon as their
operands are available rather than being required to wait to execute
in program order, and is permitted insofar as the instruction re-
ordering still preserves program correctness. In a Meltdown attack,
malicious out-of-order instructions use the secret value obtained
by the unauthorized memory access before the exception is han-
dled, which can affect microarchitectural structures such as the L1
data cache. Like Spectre, Meltdown then uses a cache side channel
timing such as Prime+Probe or Flush+Reload to leak the secret.
A New Doctrine for Hardware Security
In the canonical Meltdown attack, the target is kernel memory.
Kernel memory is typically mapped into the virtual address space of
every process as a performance enhancement technique—it allows
for kernel memory pages to remain in memory and in the transla-
tion lookaside buffer (TLB) when the operating system undergoes
a context switch. Since Meltdown provides a way for an unprivi-
leged process to read privileged data, all of kernel memory becomes
readable. And because the kernel itself typically contains the virtual-
to-physical mappings of all of physical memory, it becomes possible
to read any memory location from inside any unprivileged user
space process.
4.3.2 Who Should Fix Meltdown? Clearly, Meltdown is a serious
problem in desperate need of a solution. What is not immediately
clear is how it should be fixed, and who should pay for the cost of
defense. Like Rowhammer, there are multiple parties who could
implement a solution to Meltdown. We now use our doctrine of
shared burdens to help us understand the problem and how to fix
it.
Let’s first look at the defense originally proposed by the Melt-
down authors: KPTI [19]. Kernel page table isolation (KPTI, also
formerly known as KAISER) actually predates Meltdown, as it was
originally intended to solve another problem, namely a kernel side-
channel attack against KASLR (kernel address space layout ran-
domization), itself a defense against memory safety exploits in the
operating system’s kernel. As it turns out, KPTI defends against
Meltdown as well. KPTI essentially removes the kernel from each
processes’ address space, thus denying Meltdown its attack sur-
face. KPTI had previously been deployed as a Linux patch, and was
implemented in Windows and OS X patches during a responsible
disclosure period before Meltdown was announced. Despite the
patches Meltdown was not completely fixed, as KPTI still leaves a
residual attack surface. It also came with a hefty performance over-
head for Users, who were stuck paying (in terms of performance)
to defend a product that was initially advertised as secure. Like
Rowhammer and Spectre, the first available solution was costly to
the Users and allows the Vendors to avoid responsibility.
Another problem with relying on KPTI to fix Meltdown is that it
places the burden of defense on the operating system vendors, who
were suddenly asked to fix a problem they didn’t create. This is un-
fair, as the Doctrine of Shared Burdens says that Vendors should be
held responsible for the security of their own products. Upon a close
examination of Meltdown, it is very clear that the problem does not
come from the OS vendors but rather the CPU vendors: Meltdown
is possible because some CPU vendors bypassed a security domain
(privileged data accesses from unprivileged processes), which is
a violation of an architectural security principle. In other words,
Meltdown was not an out-of-the-blue, completely unexpected and
unprecedented attack like Spectre; Rather Meltdown may best be
described as simply a bug, and clearly the CPU vendors should be
held responsible.
Takeaway #5: Fixing Meltdown is the responsibility of the
CPU vendors whose products were insecurely designed.
Since the CPU industry lacks an Authority that can set rules
and mediate problems, we may expect a prisoner’s dilemma simi-
lar to Spectre that prevents CPU vendors from fixing the problem.
However, Meltdown arose under certain circumstances that has
allowed the free market to partially fix the problem on its own. We
highlight two circumstances—endogenous to the marketplace—that
have helped fix Meltdown. First, at least in the x86 marketplace
which dominates desktop and server computing, Meltdown was
isolated to only one CPU vendor—Intel—while its main competi-
tor, AMD, was unaffected. And second, Meltdown (and Spectre)
received an enormous amount of publicity at the time, unprece-
dented for a hardware vulnerability. Meltdown was covered by
major mainstream news organizations, and it became known far
outside the niche domain of hardware security. This undoubtedly
broke down the information asymmetry between Intel and its con-
sumers, who now knew of a problem that while they maybe didn’t
fully understand, were definitely aware that Intel’s products were
vulnerable. Consumers then could then knowingly choose between
a Meltdown-susceptible processor or a Meltdown-free processor.
Clearly, it was in Intel’s best financial interest to fix their pro-
cessors as fast as possible to make them more competitive in the
marketplace. And in late 2018, that’s exactly what Intel did. Intel
announced its new Whiskey Lake architecture, which among other
things, had in-silicon fixes to the problem.
Takeaway #6: Market forces can sometimes fix problems
on their own without the need for a coercive Authority.
While this may seem like a success of the free market, there are
some notable caveats that need to be addressed. The primary issue
is that without an Authority to mediate vulnerability disclosure,
there are tremendous incentives for Vendors to delay known vul-
nerabilities and downplay their risks once they are known. We see
this in the case of Meltdown and particularly in the later but related
MDS attacks [20, 21]. In both cases, the vulnerability was known to
CPU vendors (in this case, Intel) for a very long time—over a year
in the case of the MDS attacks—before the vulnerability was pub-
licly disclosed. This is very different from software security, where
the process from vulnerability discovery to patch is typically 90
days or less. This tremendous delay between vulnerability discov-
ery and vulnerability defense hugely exacerbates the information
asymmetry between Vendor and User, as the Vendor is selling a
known insecure product to the User without the User’s knowledge,
potentially for many months if not longer. There was an even larger
gap between when Intel first learned of Meltdown and when they
first announced their intent to fix it. To fix these problems, the
intervention of an Authority may be needed.
We propose the use of a self-regulatory organization (SRO) to act
as an Authority and improve vulnerability response. Such an SRO
needs to be comprised of the members it regulates, who are the only
ones who understand the sheer complexity of modern hardware
designs and how to best regulate them. Under this approach, vul-
nerability researchers would no longer have to wait on the Vendor’s
terms before announcing discovered vulnerabilities, and would no
longer have to try to talk the Vendors into fixing the discovered
problems. A SRO could act as a mediator between vulnerability
researchers and Vendors, and could wield the authority necessary
to bring the Vendors to make meaningful change.
Takeaway #7: Authorities such as SROs need to mediate
the disclosure of vulnerabilities.
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5 CONCLUSION
The prognosis for hardware security is grim. The rate at which
serious vulnerabilities are discovered far outpaces the computer
hardware industry’s ability (or motivation) to fix the problems.
Without a common understanding of why these problems arise and
persist we may never achieve true hardware security. The Doctrine
of Shared Burdens aims to rectify this by providing a conceptual
framework that advances the discourse on what kinds of action
need to be taken and where they should come from.
Implementing the Doctrine of Shared Burdens creates a unique
set of challenges for engineers, researchers, and policymakers. For
example, assuming an Authority decides to greater regulate Ven-
dors’ products, what kind of technical solutions enable an Authority
to audit a Vendor’s security mechanisms? What kind of technical
solutions enable Vendors to better punish anomalous behavior com-
ing from the Attackers? Likewise, what technical solutions enable
Authorities to better catch and prosecute the Attackers? How does
an Authority ensure that Users are following sound security prac-
tices without infringing on User privacy? How can Users trust that
the products they buy have been designed to be secure? Such ques-
tions (and their solutions) may be critical in fixing longstanding
security problems and preventing new ones altogether.
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Appendix A MARKET FAILURES IN
HARDWARE SECURITY
Amarket failure is an economic situationwherein a freemarket fails
to produce the most efficient distribution of goods or services. Mar-
ket failures are a known issue in security that have been discussed
in the past [22]. Despite hardware security’s unique characteristics,
we find that it succumbs to many of the same market failures as
other areas of security. In this appendix we examine four types of
market failures from the perspective of hardware security.
A.0.1 Information Asymmetry/Markets for Lemons. A common
failure of open and free markets is information asymmetry. In this
failure, one party of an economic transaction has more or better
information than the other. For example, consider a scenario where
a hardware company knows of serious security vulnerabilities in
their product but decides that it would be too costly to fix. It would
be rational for a self-interested company to not publicly disclose the
vulnerability for fear that it would damage their reputation and hurt
sales. There is then an imbalance or asymmetry of information (i.e.
the presence of the vulnerability) between the company and its cus-
tomers. Without knowing of the serious vulnerabilities, customers
will continue to buy the product to their own detriment. Breaking
down this information asymmetry would push customers to pur-
chase safer, competing products instead, and would incentivize the
company to patch the vulnerability.
Information asymmetry leads to a related market failure known
as the market for lemons [23]. The market for lemons, first ex-
plained in the context of the marketplace for used cars, is a situa-
tion wherein information asymmetry degrades the quality of goods
in the marketplace. Imagine a marketplace of used cars, where
some of the cars are of good quality while others are defective (the
“lemons”). The car dealers will price the cars accordingly, selling
the more valuable good cars at a higher price point and selling
the lemons for cheap. But only the car dealers know the difference
between the good cars and the lemons, because the buyers don’t
know enough about cars to distinguish the good from the bad (be-
cause of information asymmetry). Buyers, not wanting to purchase
a lemon, will be willing to pay a fixed price somewhere between the
price of a good car and a lemon. The result is that the dealers will
only sell when they possess lemons, because they will be selling
a low-value car at a price higher than the car is worth and make
a profit. Likewise, dealers will leave the marketplace when they
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possess good cars, because the dealers won’t want to sell a good car
for less than it’s worth. This introduces a negative feedback loop
that pushes the good cars out of the marketplace and floods it with
low-quality, defective lemons.
In other words, customers are unwilling to pay a premium for
a feature or quality they can’t identify. We see the same principle
apply to hardware security. Hardware is dizzyingly complex, and
the average customer is not technically knowledgeable enough to
be able to distinguish secure from insecure products. The effect is
that the more secure but more expensive products will be driven
out of the marketplace, leaving behind only the cheaper, less-secure
products. Widespread security suffers as a result, and the general
welfare of society is worse off.
A.0.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma, borrowed
from game theory, is a scenario where it is rational for two self-
interested entities to not cooperate, even if it is in their best interest
to do so. The classic formulation is as follows: Assume there are
two prisoners who are being charged for the same crime. In or-
der to prosecute either prisoner, the prosecutors need the second
prisoner to testify against the first. If the two prisoners cooperate
by remaining silent and refuse to rat each other out, then there
isn’t enough evidence to convict either prisoner, and so the two
prisoners are only convicted of lesser charges and given a light
prison sentence. But the prosecutors, being clever, offer immunity
to either prisoner if they testify against the other, and without be-
ing testified against themselves. This means that a prisoner who
betrays the other or “defects” walks away free while their partner
in crime is given a severe prison sentence. If both prisoners betray
the other (i.e. “defect”) by witnessing against the other, then both
prisoners are convicted and are given a moderate prison sentence.
The optimal outcome for the prisoners is achieved when the
prisoners cooperate and don’t testify against each other. However,
the incentives are such that it is rational for both prisoners to defect,
making both prisoners worse off than if they had cooperated. We
can see similar dynamics in security. Imagine a market for lemons
where products are insecure and the customers can’t distinguish
between safe and unsafe products (but can distinguish between
product performance). It is in the best interest of all for the product
vendors to agree on some kind of collective action (i.e. cooperate)
to fix their products’ insecurity. Assume that this collective action
towards defense will degrade the products’ performance slightly
but greatly enhance security. The incentives are then the same as
the prisoners in the prisoner’s dilemma: It is rational for a product
vendor to defect (i.e. not implement the defense and not take the
performance hit) in the hopes that the competing vendors don’t
defect, so that the defecting vendor’s product has a performance
edge over its competitor’s products and becomes more competi-
tive in the marketplace. If all the vendors were rational, no one
would cooperate to jointly improve security, leaving everyone in
a suboptimal state of security. In an unconstrained market, such
prisoner’s dilemmas can disincentivize those with the ability to
improve security from doing so.
A.0.3 Misaligned Incentives. Another marketplace failure occurs
when those who responsible for providing security are not those
who suffer in case of insecurity. For example, consider a CPU ven-
dor with a hardware flaw that allows attackers to read privileged
memory, such as cryptographic keys or sensitive financial informa-
tion. If a user is attacked, only the user suffers the consequences,
and not the CPU vendor whose insecure product allowed the attack
to happen in the first place. Combined with the market for lemons
principle, this means that the CPU vendor has little incentive to
create a more secure product.
A.0.4 Free Riding. Related to the prisoner’s dilemma is the prob-
lem of free riding. This market failure occurs when those who
benefit from some shared resource rationally do not pay for them.
A common example is vaccinations: If a community is widely vacci-
nated against some disease, it would be rational for an individual to
forgo the hassle of vaccination, because the individual is protected
by the herd immunity provided by the vaccinated population (i.e.
the individual “free rides” off of the efforts of others). Of course,
if everyone applied this thinking, no one would get vaccinated,
herd immunity would disappear, and disease would spread. We see
similar problems in security.
Because security is so dependent on the cyber health of an en-
tire community, it is rational for an individual not to pay their
fair contribution towards community security and free ride off of
others. For example, if a CPU vendor releases a patch that hurts
performance, it is rational for the CPU user to not apply the patch
in the hopes that the other community members do apply the patch,
allowing the user to free ride off of the security benefits of others
without themselves taking the hit to performance. This leads to a
market failure where no one patches and the community is worse
off than if the individuals had patched their systems.
Appendix B FIRE SAFETY AS AN EXTENDED
ANALOGY
Our Doctrine of Shared Burdens is highly analogous to fire safety.
In developing our doctrine, we found it useful to think in terms
of metaphor and analogy and use fire safety as a starting point.
Fire safety, much like security, is a full-system property, where all
aspects of the systemmust be secured for the system as awhole to be
secure. But unlike hardware security, fire safety has been developed
and refined for literally thousands of years. It provides a mature
model of how society can collectively and efficiently respond to a
persistent threat, where the roles of those responsible for fire safety
are well-established, effective, and generally uncontroversial. In
contrast, computer security has only seen a few decades of effort
in an ever-changing landscape of threats and vulnerabilities, and
we haven’t had the time or stability to reach a mature theory on
what the roles are in security and who should bear responsibility.
We can use the fire safety model to illuminate what roles there
are in hardware security and how they each contribute towards
overall security. The first and most obvious observation is that
security today places far too much of a burden on the end user.
Users are being placed into situations where they are powerless to
defend themselves, but are entirely responsible for their own safety
and well-being. This is akin to building a house made of matches
and then blaming the residents when the house burns down. The
analogy continues: Because building residents typically don’t know
the fire code, they cannot themselves distinguish between safe and
unsafe buildings. The effect is that the market cannot price houses
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accordingly (since buyers are unwilling to pay a premium for a fea-
ture they cannot observe) and it becomes rational for the architects
to design cheaper but less-safe houses. We see the same effect in
hardware security: Consumers—who are generally unaware of the
hardware vulnerabilities in today’s products—are purchasing unsafe
hardware because they don’t know any better, and subsequently
assume all risk if the hardware is hacked. And because consumers
are unwilling to pay for protection against a threat they don’t know
exists, it becomes rational for hardware vendors to not include
costly security measures in their products. Only unsafe products
remain in the marketplace, which stabilizes in a suboptimal state.
If security today places too much of a burden on the end user,
then a corollary is that it does not place enough of a burden on
the architect. In the example of the house made of matches, it is
obvious that such a house should have never been built in the first
place. Present-day hardware security has no such notion. Hardware
vendors are free to market and sell products with serious vulnerabil-
ities to the unknowing public, who are too unaware of the problem
to nudge the markets into fixing the problem.
Another takeaway from the fire safety model is that present-day
security is seen as a personal issue and not as a community responsi-
bility. Indeed, there is no equivalent of a publicly-funded firefighter
in today’s security landscape. The lack of collective response to
security threats means that metaphorical fires are spreading freely
among hosts: Botnets, largely composed of insecure and unpatched
devices, are a routine threat because no one bears responsibility to
take them down. And worms that distribute dangerous malware
are a scourge of connected devices because once again, there is no
organized defense to stop the spread.
A final, key takeaway from the fire safetymodel is that the system
depends on clearly-defined responsibilities. Nothing is allowed to
slip through the cracks. And if a new fire “vulnerability” is found
(perhaps a material is discovered to be excessively flammable, or a
new type of building floorplan gets too congested during building
evacuation), then the fire code is updated to attribute responsibility
somewhere. In using the fire safety analogy, a new security doctrine
must allow for adaptable responsibilities, especially in a field which
changes so frequently.
Of course, no model is perfect. A key difference between hard-
ware security and fire safety is that fires are accidents3, whereas
cyberattacks are not. Unlike fire, attackers deliberately find the
weakest points in a system and exploit them. However, we argue
that this distinction has no meaningful consequences. Both fire and
cyberattacks take the path of least resistance. And in both cases, the
best defense is to patch the known weak spots. We conclude that
intent is irrelevant, and that this seemingly important difference
bears no effect on the analogy’s applicability.
3Arson is an exception, but irrelevant here
